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The  quest I  on of susta  I nab  I I I ty of pub I I c  sector debt  In the presence of 
high  budget  deficits  and  a  positive  Interest  rate-growth  rate 
d I f ferent I a I  has  receIved  wIdespread  at  tent  I on  1  n  recent  years.  The 
r lsks of  .. explosion  ..  of  the public debt  and  the eventual  monet lzat  I on 
which  could  result  In  high  Inflation  have  often  been  at  the  roots  of 
sever  a I  meet I un-term progranmes of budgetary conso  1  I dat  I on. 
The  paper,  after  .presenting  the  classical  results  of  the  debt 
susta  I nab  I I I ty  ana I ys Is  (sect  I on  I ) ,  Introduces  gradua  I  budgetary 
conso  I I ctat I on  In  a  mode  I  a  I a  Sargent  and  Wa 1  I ace  (exogenous  Interest 
rate-growth  rate differential  and  quantitative money  dEmand  function) 
so  as  to derIve  the  adjustment  In  the  .. prImary..  ba  I ance  necessary  In 
order  to  stabilize  the  debt-lncane  ratio  by  a  certain  time  In  the 
future  (section  II). 
The  conseQuences  of  different  policy  regimes  - cooperation  between 
monetary and  fiscal  authorities,  leadership by  fiscal  authorities or by 
monetary  author I ties  - for  the  budgetary  adjustment,  the  rate  of 
I nf  I at  I on  and  the  level  of  the debt-GJP  rat lo are explored  In  sect I  on 
I II.  If the fiscal  authorities are not able  (or willing)  to carry out 
the  whole  adjustment,  debt  stabilization  requires  an  Increase  In  the 
11selgnlorate  tax  ..  which  could  IIJ1)1y  a  substantl.al  acceleration  In  the 
rate of  monetary  growth.  If the  monetary  authorities  act  as  leaders 
and  the  f I sea  I  author It  I es  pursue  an  adjustment  I ower  than  the 
eQUIIIbrlun one,  the stabilization of  the debt-GJP  ratio could  require 
a  sign If  lcant  II junp  ..  In the pr lmary balance at the end of the per lod. 
A  simple application of the model  to Italy's debt-stabl I lzatlon problem 
Is made  In sect  I  on  IV.  The maIn cone I us  I  on of the ana  I ys Is  Is that the 
~vernrent  progr211me  of  budgetary  conso  I I dat  I  on  appears  to  requ I re  a 
considerable  Increase  In  seigniorage which  Is  likely to contrast with 
the objectIves of monetary stab  I I I ty. 
In  the  last  section,  after  sunnarlzlng  the  main  results  of  the 
ana I ys Is,  a  pre  I lm I nary attEIJl)t  Is made  to go beyond  the ar  I thnet  I  c  of 
the debt sustalnablllty  Issue and to consider  Its economics. -~-
I.  Pl.BLIC DEBT  (LN)SUSTAINABILITY 
Our I ng  the past  feN  years  the so-called  ••f I xed-parameters  ..  project  Ions 
of publ lc debt  have been  largely used  In the analysis of the effects of 
sustained  fiscal  deficits (1). 
The  bas 1  c  equatIon  used  In  these  exercIses  represents  the  constraInt 
faced  by the government  In  financing publ lc deficits 
( 1 ) 
where,  M  :  rrone~  base,  B  :  marKet  hoI dIngs  of  government  bonds,  f  : 
deficit  (-)  or  surplus  (+)  net  of  Interest  payments  ( .. primary  .. 
balance),  I  :  nanlnal  Interest  rate  paid  on  market  securities,  1m  : 
institutionally fixed  Interest rate paid on M. 
By  taking  ratios  to  <DP  (lover  case  letters)  and  re-arranging,  (1) 
becanes  : 
where  r  and  y  are  the  (ex-post)  rea  I  Interest  rate  paId  on  market 
secur It  I es  and  rea  I  grovth  rate  of  the  econany,  respect I ve  I y;  9n  Is 
the rate of grovth of  the money  base  (we  assume  that deficit financing 
Is the on I y  channe I  of creatIon of money  base). 
The  term  (~  lm)m  Is  the  seigniorage  tax  extracted  through 
rronetary  f I nanc  I ng,  I . e.  the  va I ue  of  rea  I  resources  appropr I a ted  by 
the government  through net  Issues of high-powered rroney. 
Let us assume 
1.  the  Interest rate-grovth rate differential  ,  r- y,  Is fixed; -£-
2.  the  danand  for  money  Is  "Quant I tat  I ve",  I . e.  M/Y  •  m  fIxed,  thus 
~  =  y  +1r,  where 1r  Is the  lnf  I at  I  on rate; 
3.  the money  base grows at a  steady rate,  I.e.~ Is given; 
4.  the primary balance F  Is kept  In a  fixed proportion to GOP,  I.e.  f 
Is given. 
5.  pr lvate sector willingness to hold goverrment debt  Is assuned to be  - I lml ted,  I .e.  b  Is constra  I red by b  ~ b; 
The  hypothesis of exogenelty of  (r - y)  Is highly restrictive. 
The  real  rate  of  Interest  Is  exogenous  If  there  exists  perfect 
subst I tutab  I I I ty  between  goverrment  debt  and  rea  I  assets  or  ,  In  open 
econan  I es,  between  goverrment  debt  and  assets  denan  I nated  In  foreIgn 
cur  rene  I es.  The  rea I  growth  of  the  ec:onany  l s  exogenous  I f  the  so-
cal led Ricardian eQuivalence holds,  I.e.  economic agents discount fully 
future taxes to re-pay the debt which  lrrc:>lles  that goverrment  bonds are 
not consIdered net wea 1  th  ( 2) . 
The  asslJTl)t I on of a  QUant I tat  lve danand  for money  (m  • m  fIxed)  lrrc:>lles 
that the value of the seigniorage tax revenue rises proportionally with 
I ncr  eases  I n  ~. 
By  following  Bulter's definitions  (see  Bulter,  1987),  the  seigniorage 
revenue  can  be  deca11posed  Into  two  CXJ1l)Onents 
rate,  ~-1m,  and  the  seigniorage  tax  base,  m. 
the  seIgn  I or  age  tax 
The  asslJTl)t I on  of  a 
Quant I tat  I ve  money  danand  lrrc:> I I es  a  constant  va  I ue  of  the  tax  base. 
HoNever,  If real  money  balances are a  decreasing  function of  Inflation 
(e.g.  eagan's  money  danand  functIon),  and  h lgher  money  grONth  rates 
sooner  or  later  lrrc:>IY  higher  Inflation,  the  velocity  of  circulation, 
1/m,  will  rise,  I.e.  the seigniorage tax  base will  fall.  Therefore,  a -4-
hIgher  va I ue  of  ~  w I I I  on I y  r I se  seIgn I or  age  I f  the  e I ast  I cIty  of 
velocity with respect  to  Inflation  Is  less  than unity  :  this  Is  I lkely 
to be the case,  at  least for relatively moderate rates of  Inflation. 
If a  higher  value of  the  seigniorage  Is  needed  In  order  to stabilise 
the debt,  the QUant I tat  I ve money  dEmand  asSlJI1)t I on  .. mIn lm I ses  II  the r I se 
In  ~  reQU I red  to  achIeve  It  :  In  the  rea I  wor I d  a  hIgher  r I se  In 
~would be probably needed  In order to CCJ11)ensate  for  the fall  In m. 
Assl.J11)t I on  3  and  4  def  I ne  the  f I sea I  ru  I e  and  the  monetary  ru  I e, 
respectively  (3). 
Assl.J11)tlon  5  asserts  that,  like all  private borra.vers,  the  goverrment 
Is  faced  by  an  upper  I lm It to  the  21110Unt  of  debt  It can  1  ssue  :  '
1 In 
August  1982,  (b)  In  Mexico  appeared  to  have  hit  (b).  In  France, 
between  1924  and  1926,  (b)  appeared  to  have  been  c I ose  to  (b) , 
precIpItatIng  a  cont I nu I ng  f I nanc I a I  cr IsIs  and  the  .. wa I tz  of 
portfolios  ..  of the finance ministers of France  ..  (Sargent,  1986,  p.  25). 
Given  assl.J11)tlons  1  - 4,  the  differential  equation  (2)  can  be  solved 
for  the  level  of the debt-lncane ratio, b(t). 
The condlt  I on  for convergence to a  f lnlte value  Is y  - r  >  0,  I .e.  the 
rea  I  rate of gra.vth of output  Is hIgher  than the  (ex post)  rea  I  rate of 
Interest.  Ulder  such a  cond It  I on,  the  I ong  run equ I I I br  I un va  I ue of 
b  (t)  Is  : 
(3) 
If the  goverrment  Is running  a  .. seigniorage-corrected  ..  pr lmary  surplus 
<I .e.  f  +  (~-lm>m  >  0),  b(t)  will  converge  to  a  negat lve  value  : 
the debt  Is progressIve  I y  reduced  and,  eventua  I I y,  Is  transformed  Into 
a  net asset position. (2) 
-5-
I f  y  <  r ,  the  debt-1 ncane  rat  I  o  Is  genera  I I  y  unstab I  e.  Under  thIs 
assl.JT1)tlon,  either  b(t)  Is  on  an  explosive  path or,  If  b(O)  •  b,  Is 
constant .  Therefore,  I f  y  <  r ,  the on I  y  •• susta  I  nab I  e"  posIt I  on  (whIch 
Is  the one of  constant  b(t))  reQUires  a  seigniorage-corrected  primary 
surplus  : 
If  the value of the seigniorage  Is relatively  low,  a  sufficiently  large 
primary surplus  Is needed  (I.e.  f  >  0). 
The  case  of  a  posItIve  Interest  rate-growth  rate  dIfferent I  a I  Is 
pictured  In  Figure  1. 
b 
. 
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By  setting b  =  0  In  eq.  2,  and  solving  for  b we  obtain 
(5)  6-
•  • 
Fig.  1 
which  Is  represented  by  the  line  (b  =  0)  In  Fig.  1.  Line  (b  •  0)  Is 
the  locus  of  all  the  carolnatlons off and  ~  which  give  rise  to  a -6-
stable  debt-G::P  rat lo.  Since  r  - y  >  o,  the  line  Is  up.vard  sloping. 
Any  CCJ11:) I nat  I on above  (be  ION)  the  I I ne corresponds to a  poInt of rIsIng 
(decreasing)  debt. 
Let  us  assune  that  A  (b(O),  ~(0))  Is  the  starting  point.  A  Is  a 
poInt of  non-equ I I I br  I un  :  the  stab  I 1  1  ty of  the  debt-G::P  ratIo at  the 
level  b(O)  would  reQUire  either  a  higher  rroney  base  grONth,  G*m(O), 
whIch  wou I d  produce  a  hIgher  seIgn  I or  age  revenue,  or  a  suffIcIent  I y 
• 
large  pr lmary  surplus,  f*(O).  In  the  latter  case,  the  line  (b  =  0) 
wou I d  be sh I fted up.vards so as to pass  through A. 
In  the  absence  of  eIther  the  debt  r I ses.  I f  no  adjustment  Is 
lltl)lanented,  the  debt  eventually  reaches  the  upper  threshold  b.  At 
that mc:ment,  s I nee  the pr  I vate sector  refuses  to  Increase  Its hoI dIngs 
of goverrment  securItIes,  the debt  has  to be  stab  I 1  1  sed.  ThIs  1111) I I es  - either  a  faster  expansion  of  money  base  fran  ~(0)  to  ~. which  Is 
the case  referred  to as  fiscal  leadership  (FL),  or  a  sudden  junp  Into 
primary  surplus  (fran  f(O)  <  0  to  f  >  0)  which  we  define  as monetary 
leadership  (M..).  The picture shONs  that  In both  cases,  because of  the 
debt accunu I at  I on whIch  has taken p 1  ace  1  n  the meanwh 1  I e,  the extent of 
the  forced  eventual  adjustment  Is  higher  than  that  reQUired  at  the 
beginning of the per lod. 
In  part  leu lar,  under  the  FL  reg I  me,  .. wIth  the  goverrment  bUdget 
persIstent  I y  In  def  I cIt  and  rea I  rates  of  Interest  exceedIng  the 
econany  •  s  grONth  rate,  the  (centra  1  bank)  n.~st  choose  between  f I ght  I ng 
present  I nf  I at  I on  wIth  .. tIght..  rronetary  po  1  1  cy  nON  or  f 1  ght  I ng  future 
lnf  latlon with  .. easy  ..  rronetary policy nON  ..  (Sargent-Wallace,  1981, 
p.  159). 
The condition of stable debt  b  •  b(O),  Implies that,  In a  situation of 
seigniorage-corrected primary deficit,  If the  Interest rate-grONth rate 
differential  becomes  positive,  a  sudden  junp  Into surplus  Is  needed 
since  plans  for  fiscal  adjustment  are  usually  characterized  by  a -7-
phasing  out  of  the  deficit  over  several  years,  the  1111)11catlons  of 
gradua  I ness have to be exp  I orecl. 
The  c:auest I on of gradua  I ness was  fIrst ra  1  sed by B I anchard  ( 19&4) • 
Let  us  define,  with Blanchard,  fM  as  the rnaxlnun politically feasible 
prImary  surp  I us,  fM  >  0,  gIven  by  the dIfference  between  the mIn  I  nun 
sex: I a I I y  aoceptab  I e  anount of (net of  Interest)  governnent  spendIng and 
the rnaxlnun anount of taxes which can be collected by the goverrment. 
The  I ong-run equ I I I br h.m  va  I ue of the debt correspondIng to fM  Is  : 
(6)  = 
I f  the  debt  exceeds  ~,  1  t  can  be  stab  1  1  1  zed  on 1  y  through  a  r I se  In 
~.  I f  we  clef I ne  ciA  as  the  max I  nun  accepted  monetary  expansIon, 
the maxlnun sustained  level  of debt beccmes 
(7) 
I f  the  debt  ever  exceeds  t:ltM,  I t  w I I I  be  forever  IncreasIng  : 
I f  b ( t)  exceeds  t:Jtf.A  (e.g.  because  the  Governnent  Is  runn  I ng  a 
prImary  clef lc  1  t  and  the  centra  I  bank  1  s  cxmn I ttecl  to  monetary 
stab Ill  ty),  a  pr  lmary  surplus  or  a  monetary  expansion  larger  than  fM 
and  ciA,  respect I ve  I y,  wou I d  be  reQU I reel  to  stab  I I I ze  the  debt  (thIs 
Is prevented by the def  1  n 1  t 1  on of  fM  and c#A) • 
If  b(O)  <  t:/tM  and  the  adjustment  Is  phased  out  over  several  years, 
the reduction of the primary deficit has to be  fast enough  In order  to 
prevent  b ( t) exceed I ng tJIM  dur I ng the adjustment per I od. -8-
Blanchard's model  Is pictured  In Figure 2. 
Fig.  2 
If the adjustment  In the primary surplus  Is fast enough  the debt can  be 
stabilized  at  a  level  b  ~  .tlM.  If the  bUdgetary  consolldat I on  Is  not 
carried out sufficiently QUickly,  monetary authorities have to step  ln. 
I f  the  I eve  I  of  debt  ever  exceeds  tfNI,  It w I I I  grON  bound I ess  I y  In 
that any adjustment  programme would  require  f  >  fM  and/or~ >  GM. 
In  section  II,  a  simple  model  of  gradual  fiscal  adjustment  Is 
presented:  the  rrode I  w I I I  be  so  I ved  for  the  I I near  equ I I I br I un 
adjustment  In the primary balance to be carried out over  a  period of  t 
years,  which  allows  the stabl llzatlon of b(t)  at  the  level  attained at 
time t. 
II. Llf'EAR  ADJUSTh£NT  AKl DEBT  STABILIZATI~ 
The present sect  I on dea Is wIth the prob  I an of debt stab  I I I zat  I on over  a 
per lad of t  years  (fran t  •  0  to t  •  t). 
We  are  Interested  In  der I vI  ng  the  annua I  adjustment  In  the  pr I  mary  - balance which allows the stabilization of the debt~  ratio at timet. -9-
~tary  author I t I es  can  contr  1  bute  to  the  debt  stab  I I I zat  I on 
progrenme  by  IncreasIng  the  rate of  gra.vth  of  money  base,  ~, whIch 
gIves r I se to a ·hIgher  seIgn  I or  age tax revenue. 
In  the present  sect  I on,  we  retaIn  asSUY1)t Ions  1  and  2  ( f I xed  Interest 
rate-grONth  rate  d I f ferent  I a I  and  quantItatIve money  c:lanand  functIon) 
and  explore  the consequences  of  adJusting  f  and  ~  so  as  to stabllze  - the debt-GJP ratIo over  a  per I od of t  years. 
The  actua  I  form  of  the  rronetary  and  f I sea  I  ru  I es  depends  on  the 
I eadersh I p  posIt  I  on of rronetary and  f I sea I  author It  I es. 
In  a  non~ratlve setting,  fiscal  authorities'  leadership  (FL)  Is 
clescr 1  bed by equat Ions  ( 8a  > and  ( 8b) 
(Sa) 
(8b) 
f (t:) -=  f(o) +ott 
f (t) = f(o)  1- o<t.. 
<:4~ (t) a  y.._,(o) 
c:;w.(t):  Cf~(o) -t  Z.p 
Equations  (8a)  state  that  the  pr  lmary  def lclt  (surplus)  Is  reduced 
( I ncr  eased)  1  1  near 1  y  by c( "  of CD'  per  year  over  a  per I  ocl  of t  years. 
The  rnoneary  author It  I es  st  I ck  to  the  In It  I a I  money  base  grONth, 
~(  0) ,  unt  1  1  the  f 1  na  1  year;  then,  g 1  ven  the  hypothesIs  of  FL,  they 
give up and  raise~ at once by zF. 
In Sargent and Wallace's seminal  work  (see Sargent-Wallace  ( 1981)),  the 
behavIour  of  poI Icy  makers  Is  descr I bed  by  equatIons  ( 8a)  and  ( 8b) 
under  the asSlJ11)t I  on 0( •  0. -10-
The  case  of  monetary  author  It~  leadershl~  (M..)  Is  descr I bed  by 
equatIons  (Sa)  and  (9b) 
- (9a)  f(t) = f(o)  -t- o<t  for- t~i::.  - ~ (t) =  ~(o)  +  ~t  +  K  for  t>i:-
In  such  a  case,  monetary  author It  I es  st  Jck  to  the  In It  I a I  rroney  base 
grONth,  ~(0),  wh I I e  f I sea  I  author It  1  es,  If  the  adjustment  Is  not  - CQ11) I eted  by  tIme t,  have to make  a  further  oorrect  I on  In  the prImary 
balance by K  "  of en:'  In the f Ina  I  year. 
In a  set up of cooper  at  I on  (C)  both monetary and  f I sea  I  authorItIes are 
willing,  from the beginning,  to oontrlbute to the adjustment. 
Such  a  scenar lo Is descrIbed by equatIons  ( 1Qa)  and  ( 10b) 
(1Qa)  {(i:) 
f (i:) 
=.  .f(o) -t-ext  - = fCo) -+«t 
for  t  >  0 -II-
In  such  a  case  «  Is  joInt  I y  determIned  and  the rronetary  author It  I es 
step  In at the beginning of the period and  raise~  by ZC. 
In  policy  regimes  c  and  FL,  ~ .. junps"  either  at  the  beginning 
(eQuation  10b)  or  at  the  end  of  the  period  (eQUation  Bb).  An 
Interesting  Intermediate  case  Is  that  In  which  ~ Is  Increased 
I !nearly over  the period  : 
( 11)  ~(t) = ~(0) +~t  for  t  ~ t 
~(t) =  ~(0) +~  t  for  t  >  t 
Under  this  assunptlon  the  .. seigniorage-corrected"  primary  balance  Is  - adjusted  1 lnearly over  the period so as to stabll lze b(t) at t  •  t. 
Polley  regimes  descrIbed  by  eQuatIons  (8)  - ( 10)  can  be  sunnar I zed  by 
equations  (12a)  and  (12b)  : 
- (12a)  f(t)  ==  f(O)  +olt  for  t  <  t  -
f(t) = f(O)  +~t +  k  - for  t  >  t 
- (12b)  ~<t> = ~<o> +  zc  for  t  <  t  -
~<t> ==  ~<O> +  zc  + zf  - for  t  >  t 
by  setting  K,  ZC,  zF,  two  by  two,  eQual  to  zero,  we  obtain  the 
three scenarios previously described. 
A  usefu  1  benchna.rk  case  1  s  obta  1  ned  by  settIng  zC  =  zF  =  K  ==  0, 
thus  fiscal  authorities pursue an  annual  eQUilibrium adjustment  In  the -12-
primary  balance  which  allONS  the  stabilization  of  b(t)  at  time  t, 
gIven the  In  1  ta  1 rate of grONth of money  base. 
By  retaInIng  the  asSU'I1)t I on  of  a  posIt  I ve  Interest  rate-grONth  rate 
dl fferent  Ia  I,  and  subst ltut  lng  equatIons  ( 12a)  and  ( 12b)  In  equatIon 
(2), we  obtain the following differential  eQUations  : 
.  - (13)  b  •  (r- y)b- f(O)  - [~(0) + ZC- lmlm- ~t fort~ t 
• 
(14)  b  •  (r - y)b - f(O)  - k  - [~(0) +  ZC  + zf - lm]m  -~t 
for  t  >  t 
EQUations  (13)  and  (14)  can  be  solved  to  find  b(t).  The  equlllbrlun 
adjustment. In  the  prlma~y balance,  o(,can  be  found  by  111'1X)slng  the 
condition b  •  0  for  t  >  t  (see Appendix  )  : 
were  'i3  ,  E,_  ,  and  ,..,C.C.  are a I I  pos  I t I ve. 
The  eQUIIIbrlun  adjustment 0(  Is  a  function of  the  Initial  conditions 
and the policy var lables  : 
+  - +  T  - -
( 16)  o(  •  0( ( b ( 0) ,  f ( 0) ,  ~(  0) ,  I  m,  m,  r -y,  t ,  zF ,  zC,  K) 
where signs above the arguments are those of partial  derivatives. 
It Is  lfT1X)rtant  to note that  a  longer  adjustment  period allONs  a  lcwer 
effort  to  be  made  each  year  ( ~  (t1)  >  O((t2>  If  t 1  <  t 2>,  but 
reQUires a  larger overall  adjustment  ( f (t1)  <  -f <t2>  ) • (3) 
-13-
It  Is  easy  to  shaN  (see  AppendIx  )  that  under  the  assurpt  I on  of  a 
I I near  rIse  In  ~ (equatIon  11),  the  express  I on  for C(  Is  the 
foiiONing 
<17>  oe  =  0 - m~ 
I f  the f I sea  I  author It  I es carry the who  1  e  burden of the adJustment,  the 
annua  I  correct  I on  In the prImary ba  1  ance beccmes  : 
( 18)  0(  = 0 
If the monetary authorities pursue a  stricter anti-Inflationary pol Icy, 
by  decreasIng  of  ~  eIther  at  the  begInnIng  or  gradua  I I y  over  the 
per I od,  the  adJustment  to be  carr  I eel  out  by  f I sea  I  author It  I es  YIOU I d 
have to C011)ensate  for the reduced value of the seigniorage tax revenue 
((X> 1f). 
If  the  f I seal  author It  les  are  not  able  (or  willing)  to  adjust  the 
primary  balance  by ,J  %  of  GJP  per  year,  and  set 0( -a<:'(,  the 
stabilization of b(t)  reQUires  a  rise  In  the seigniorage  revenue  or  a 
further  correct  I on  by  K  % of  GJP  1  n  the  prImary  ba  1  ance  In  the  f Ina  I 
year .  Therefore,  gIven 0( •  ~  ,  we  obtaIn 
(C)  zC- 15-0< 
E.. 
(FL)  zF  •  a-O< 
~ 
(M..)  K  •  ~--~ 
/'<-
I f  ~  Is  I ncr  eased  I I near I y  over  the per I od,  the eQU I I I br I un  ~ Is 
~.,.~-a. 
m - 14-
I I I.  STEADY-STATE  RESULTS  UNDER  DIFFERENT  POLICY  REGIMES 
The  present  section deals with the effects on b(t),  f(t)  and  lr(t) of 
budgetary  consolidation  under  different  policy  regimes,  under  the 
assurc:>t 1  on  r -Y  >  0.  We  assune  that o(  I s  set  at «  ~  1f and  zC,  zF  and 
K  are endogenously detenmlned. 
A.  Total  adjustment  In the primary balance 
Under  c  and  FL  regimes,  If <X  Is  set  at ~<1,  the  rate of  grONth  of 
money  base,  ~,  ajdusts  by  zC  and  zF,  respect lvely,  so  as  to 
stab  I I I se  b( t)  at t.  Therefore,  the  tota  I  adjustment  In  the  prImary 
ba  I ance  Is the same  under  the two reg lmes. 
The  adjustment  Is higher  under  ML  :  In  such  a  case  the seigniorage tax 
revenue  Is gIven,  thus  the prImary surp  I us  eventua  I I y  has  to  "Jurc:>"  by 
K% of GOP. 
It  Is  easy  to  shaN  that,  under  ML,  the  tota  I  prImary  adjustment  Is 
mIn lm I zed  If f I sea  I  authorItIes choose a  = 0 , whIch corresponds to our 
benctmark  case  :  In  such  a  case  the correct  I on  In  the  pr I  mary  ba I ance 
Is  .. just  enough"  to  stabllze  the  debt  at t, without  the  need  for  a 
further rise  In the surplus  (K=O): 
- ML.  +o t  f(  o( -cr  )  •  f(O) 
f(O(  <(f  )14L  •  f(O)  +CXt+K 
were K  •  l-0< 
~ 
Therefore by substituting from the Appendix  (4)  : - 15-
S I nee  debt  r I ses  faster  underO( <  1  as  a  conseQUenCeS  of  a  I a.ver 
adJustment,  the  Interest burden  rises,  thus the fiscal  Jump  K  required 
to stab  I I I ze the debt  I eads to a  I arger overa  I I  adjustment. 
B.  Effects on the  Inflation rate 
GIven  the assumptIon of a  Quant I tat  I ve money  dEmand  functIon,  the rate 
of  Inflation  fully  reflects  the  rate of  gra.vth  of  money  supply,  ~: 
11'{t)  - ~{t)-y. 
The  lowest  Inflation rate  Is clearly achieved  under monetary authority 
leadership  OW  ... )  :  In  such  a  case ~  does  not  r lse,  thus  the  lnf  latlon 
rate  Is constant over  the period  {1fM..- 1f'(0)). 
Under  c,  ~  r lses  by  zC  at  the  beginning  of  the  per loci,  white, 
under  FL,  ~  Is raised eventually by zF. 
We  can  shaN  that,  for a  g I veni  <twe  obtaIn,  zF  >  zC 
F  lJ' _c;:  z-- -
and  zC  •  1-~ 
48  ~ 
By substItutIng fran t  and  e.  ,  In AppendIx  , we  obtain 
(lS'-00[ t'-~)~- -t] 
(20)  zF  - zC  - > 0 
EQUat I  on  { 20)  re-states the c I ass  1  ca  1 Sargent  and wa I I ance  resu It In a 
context  of  gradual  adJustment  In  the  pr lmary  balance  under 
I ncons  I stent monetary  and  f I sea  I  obJectIves,  I f  f I sea  I  author It  I es act 
as  leaders,  a  lower  rate of  Inflation  In the short  run gives rise to a 
higher  rate of  Inflation  In the  long run. 
As  we  can  see  fran  eQuation  (20)  the  Inflation  differential  Is 
Inversely  correlated  wlthi:  the  lower  the  annual  adjustment  In  the 
primary balance,  the higher  the eventual  rise  In  Inflation. -16-
It Is easy to shaN  that  a  linear  Increase  In ~  over  the period  gives 
r I se to a  I ong  run  I nf  I at  I on  rate 'whIch  1  s  1  ntermed  1  ate  between  those 
observed under OC><)perat I on and  f I sea  I  I eac:tersh I p. 
c.  Egulllbr  lun  level  of the debt 
The  IONeSt  level  at which the debt  Is stabilized  Is that achieved under 
co-operation.  At  the  limit,  If the whole adjustment  Is carried out by 
the  monetary  author It  I es  ( I . e.  0(  •  0,  zC  • ~/e,) ,  the  debt  Is 
stabilized at  Its starting  level  :  b  •  b(O). 
For  a  gIven annua  I  adjustment  In the pr  I  mary ba  I ance,  the  I eve  I  of  the 
debt  Is the seme  under FL( ol • CX  ,  zF  >  0)  and M..(  (X  •  Qi.,  K  >  0). 
bFL  •  bM- because  over  the  per I oct,  the  seIgn  I or  age  revenue  and  the 
correction  In the primary balance are the sane  In the  two  regimes  (the 
f Ina  I  jln1)  In the pr  I  mary surp  I us or  In the money  grONth are needed  In 
order to stab  I I I ze the debt at the  I eve  1 atta  1  ned  In t)  . 
As  Is  1111)11clt  In the above reasoning,  the effect on b(t) of a  shift  In 
the  bUrden  of  the  adjustment  between  monetary  and  f I sea  I  authorItIes 
depends  on  the policy  regime.  lh:ter  C,  a  rise  In'«.  which  l~lles a 
fall  In monetary financing,  raises the eQUII lbrlun  level  of debt  (5)  : 
c..  (.  .....  _.!) )-E,  -
<21>  C) b  "'  - e  ["' - t.(r-~)J 
dO(  =  2.  <r-~r~  >  o 
(r--~)  e. 
On  the contrary,  under M..  and  FL,  a  r I se  1  n d.  resu Its  In a  fa  I I  of the 
eQUIIIbr lun  level  debt  (6)  :  _ 
(r-_!1)t: 
A  + t  ( r-~) - e_  <  0 
(22)  - - (t-- !1)  2. 
- U1der both,  M..  and FL,  the  1  ONeSt  I eve  I  of b  Is achIeved by settIng 
0<=~· -17-
I t  Is  I nter~  I ng  to note  that  In  the  case  of  1  I near  I ncr  ease  In ~ 
<  1 .e. ,  •  f -« )  ,  the equlllbr  tun  level  of  debt  Is  Independent  of  the 
W\ 
d I str  I but  I on of the adjustment between monetary and  f 1  sea  I  author It  I es: 
J 
-~ 
db=:O  asc 
ThIs  resu It Is due to the  fact  that,  un  I Ike the other  poI Icy  reg  lmes, -
the  adjustment  In  the  "selgnlorage-<:orrected"  primary  balance  Is  the 
same  under ~  -:=.1f  and 0c <  ~ , f,::: l$-Ol  •  S I nee  the  debt  aca.mJ  I at  I on 
~ 
depends on  the adjustment  In the seigniorage-corrected pr  lmary balance,  - the  level  of  debt  attained at  t  •  t  Is the  same  under  the  two policy 
options. 
Resu Its estab  I I shed  In sectIons A-C can be sunnar 1  zed  as  fo  I IONS 
f~L  = r::.  ~-- <.  ~* ( ~ML. 
i{t.) =  1r"""(t) = lr\=L(t) < lfc.C.t)  J  ~r ts  .f 
lt*(t):~(~) <lf-(t)< ~(.t)  < 1TfL(t) J  -tor  -b>t 
be < b* :a.  ba. <  bPL.-::  bML 
where  "*"  Indicates  the  benctmark  case~•Jand  "~ 
11  that  In  which  ~ 
Is  I ncr  eased  I I near I y  over  the per I ocl. 
IV.  APPLICATI~ TO  A HIGI IEBT  ECDOAY  11£ CASE  OF  ITALY 
Ita  I y'  s  pub  I lc  fInance  sItuatIon  Is  a  .. natura I"  case  study  for  an 
Illustration  of  the  "arlttmetlc  model"  developed  In  the  previous 
7 
section  < ) • 
The  behavIour  of  the  reI  evant  parameters  for  the  per loci  1980-88  Is 
SU1'11lar I zed  I n  Tab I e  1 • -18-
The  tota  I  pub 1  1  c  sector  debt  has  r 1  sen  fran  59%  of CDP  In  1980 to 96% 
In  1988.  The  r I se  has  a I  most  ent Ire  I y  been  In market  he  I d  debt  wh I I e 
the debt held by the cetnral  bank  has remained  fIat at around  13-14" of 
CDP. 
The  primary  deficit,  after  rising  until  1985,  decl lned  In  the 
subsequent  two years to atta  I n  3, 1" of CDP  In  1988. 
The  nself..perpetuatlng•  elanent  of  debt  grcwth,  the  Interest  rate-
grcwth  rate  differential,  was  clearly  negative  In  1980-81,  virtually 
zero  In  1982-84  and  posItIve  In  the  f Ina  I  four  years.  Therefore,  In 
the  per lod  1985-88,  the  debt  has  been  grcwl ng  on  a  path  of  dynanlc 
unsustalnablllty. 
The  Treasury  seigniorage  has  shONn  an  erratic  behaviour  :  since  the 
seigniorage  tax  base,  m,  and  1m  have  been  virtually constant  over  the 
per 1  od,  the  who I e  var I ab  I I I ty  can  be  attr  I buted  to  the  money  gra.vth 
elanent,  ~. of the seigniorage tax rate. 
At  the end of May  1989,  the Goverrment  presented  an  updated versIon of 
the medium-term plan of fiscal  adjustment  c8> which alms at stabl I lzlng 
the debt-GP ratio by  1992  (see  Table 2).  The  objective  Is to be met 
through  an  adjustment  of  the  pr  I  mary  ba  I ance  of  0,  9%  of  CDP  per  year 
over  three years,  to reach  a  sna I I  pr I  mary  surp  I us  of  0,  6%  of  CDP  In 
1992.  The  Interest rate-grONth rate d I f ferent  I a I  Is expected to rena In 
posItIve between 2  and  3%. 
As  a  result,  the public sector  borrcwlng  requlranent  falls  fran  11 ,4" 
of  CDP  In  1989  to  7,6%  of  CDP  In  the  f Ina  I  year.  The  public  sector 
debt  Is stab  I I zed at around  106% of CDP. 
ftC  exp  I I cIt  asSU11)t Ions  are  made  on  monetary  po  1 Icy.  HaNever,  the 
progrsnne  poInts out  that  a  r I se  In  money  f I nanc  I ng  Is  endangered  by 
the  IncreasIng  European  monetary  IntegratIon  and  by  the  forthcan  I ng 
I I bera  I I zat  I on of short-term capIta  I  movsnents. -19-
In  the  application  of  the rrodel  developed  In  section  II,  to  Italy's 
debt  stabllzatlon problem,  we  assume  as a  starting point  the situation 
of  1989  as  It was  expected by  the Government  In  Play  1989. 
The  Initial  rate of  growth  of  money  base,  ~(0), which  In  the model 
corresponds  to  the  rate of  growth  of  nanlnal  lncane,  and  the money-
base-GJP  rat lo,  m,  are set at 9,0%  and  13%  respect lvely. 
Therefore,  given  the assumption of a  net  Interest rate on  central  bank 
holdings  of  Government  debt,  1m,  of  5,5%,  these  assumptions  Imply  an 
Initial  seigniorage tax revenue of 0,5% of GOP. 
Tab I  es  3-6  present  the  resu Its  of  the  app I I  cat  I  on  of  the  I I  near 
adjustment  model  to  Italy's  debt  stabilization  under  different 
assumptIons  about  the  Interest  rate-growth  rate  dIfferentIa  I  ( 1  ,0%, 
2,0%,  3,0%)  and  the adjustment period  (3,  7,  10  years).  After deriving 
the  linear  eQulllbrlun adjustment  In  the  benctmark  case,i:lttable 3), 
we  examIne  the conseQUences  of sett  I  ngCJ.=t/2. on  the monetary  expansIon 
under  regimes  C  and  FL  (table 4),  the primary  surplus under  regime  ML 
(table  5),  and  the  eQUIIIbrlun  level  of  debt  under  different  regimes 
(table 6). 
- - A sunnary of  the  resu Its under  t  =  3,  0( •  0,9%,  as  In  the government 
adjustment plan,  Is presented  In  table 7. 
Such  a  degree of adjustment would  be sufficient to stabll lze the debt-
GOP  ratio,  under  constant  ~,  If  the  Interest  rate-growth  rate 
d I  f ferent I  a I  does not exceed  1  , 0%. 
Under  hIgher  (and,  probab I  y,  more  rea I I  st  I  c)  va I  ues  of  the 
dIfferentIa  I,  2,0%  and  3,0%,  7)  becanes  1  ,2% and  1,5%  respect lvely.  If 
the  f I  sea  I  authorItIes  are w  I I I I  ng  to  reduce  the  prImary  defIcIt  by 
only  0,9%  of  GOP  per  year,  debt  stabilization  reQuires  a  rise  In  the -20-
rroney  base  grcwth  (eIther  at  the  begInnIng  (C)  or  at  the  end  of  the 
period  (FL))  or  a  final  additional  jump  In  the  primary  surplus  which 
has  to  be  I ncr  eased  by  a  further  K  •  0,  ~  of  GJP  at  the  end  of  the 
per led. 
The  I  ONeSt  eQU I I I br  I un  I eve  I  of the debt  Is attaIned under C  :  under 
r  - y  •  2,01,  the  .. jump••  In  the money  base  fran  9,c::&  to  15,6% at  the  - beginning of the period allONs a  ••gain••  In b  of  1,3% relative to the FL 
regime  (93,3% - 90,  ~). 
The  resu Its of  the  ca  I  cuI at  Ions  under  the  assumpt I on  r  - y  •  3%  are 
shown  In Figure 3. 
Three  Interest  I ng  phenanena are hIgh  I I ghtec:l  by tab  I e  7  : 
I)  Given  a  seigniorage  tax  base,  m,  of  13%  of  GJP,  a  non-
neg  I I g I b I e  contr I but  I  on  to  rronetary  author It  I es  to  the 
adjustment  process,  lf11)11es  a  substantial  acceleration  In  the 
money  base  grONth;  the  recau I red  hIgher  ~  Is very  senst  I ve  to 
the va  I ue of the  Interest rate-grONth rate d I f ferent  I a I  :  under 
C  and  FL,  a  differential  of  3,01  requires  a  jump  In  ~which 
Is  13,6%  and  14,8S,  respectively,  higher  than  when  the 
differential  Is  1,c::&. 
II)  Given  the  short  adjustment  per led  (t  •  3),  the  steady  state 
I eve  I  of  ~ Is  not  very  d I f ferent  under  C  and  FL  :  I f  the 
adjustment  Is  spread  over  a  longer  per I oct,  the  dl fference 
between  a;  and  cfL  may  becxme  lfi1X)rtant  (see  tab  I e  4) . 
Therefore,  If  1992  remains  the  deadline  for  the  stabilization 
of  the  debt-GJP  ratio,  the  rise  ••as  soon  as  posslbte••  In  ~ 
does  not  a liON  any  relevant  gain  In  terms of  lnf  I at  I on  In  the 
final  period. 
1  1  I )  A I though  the over  a I I  adjustment  In the prImary ba  I ance  Is on I y 
s I I ght  I y  h I gher  under M..,  than under  a(:  lJ (  0, 1" of GJP  under 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































given  •  0,9%,  the  eventual  adjustment  In  the  pr lmary  balance 
Is  1,9%  of  CDP  under  r  - y  •  3,CK.  Therefore,  relatively 
hIgher  f I sea  I  adjustment  year  by  year  cou I d  a I I ow  the 
governnent  to avoid  a  "cold  turkey"  correct  I on  In  the  pr lmary 
balance at the end of the per loci  (9). 
V.  <D I tG BEYON)  THE  AR I Tt-t£T I  C 
The  paper  develops  a  Slrt1Jie  method  for  calculating  the  annual 
adjustment  In  the  pr  I  mary  ba  I ance  necessary  In  order  to  stab  I I I ze 
the  debt-Income  ratio at  a  certain  time  In  the  future,  given  the 
Interest  rate-growth  rate  d I f ferent I a I  and  a  Quant I tat  I ve  money 
demand  funct I on. 
Three  "ext  rene"  poI Icy  reg lmes  are  sIng  I ed  out  :  co-oper  at  I on 
between monetary  and  fiscal  authorities,  ln.whlch  the distribution 
of  the  adjustment  Is  jointly  determined  and  the  monetary 
author It  I es  raIse  the  money  base  growth  at  the  begInnIng  of  the 
period;  fiscal  authority  leadership,  In which  the adjustment  In the 
pr lmary balance  Is  lower  than that needed  to stabilize the debt-<DP 
ratio  and  monetary  pol Icy  eventually  gives  In  by  making  the 
remaining  part of  the adjustment;  monetary authority  ladershlp,  In 
wh I ch  the pr  I  mary  ba I ance,  I f  the adjustment  I s  not  CCl11) I eted,  has 
to unc:tergo  a  further correct  I on. 
The  ana I ys Is  In  sect  I on  I I  Is  based  on  the  asslJT1)t I on  of  a  f I xed 
Interest  rate-growth  differential.  Such  an  over-Sirt1JI lflcatlon 
has  to  be  kept  In  mInd  In  assessIng  the  nuner I ca I  ca11)Utat Ions 
presented  In section Ill. 
Same  of  the  consequences  of  relaxing  the  assumption  of  exogenelty 
of  the differential  have  been  explored  by Galli  (1985)  and  Masson 
{ 1985). -23-
I  n  a  fu I I  El1ll I  oyment  rrocte I  w  I  th conSlJll)t I  on  as a  funct I  on  of  rea I 
wea 1  th  and  quantItatIve money  dEmand,  Ga I I I  ( 1985)  shaNs  that,  If 
( 1)  the  Ricardian  eQUivalence  does  not  hold,  I .e.  real  wealth 
Inc I  udes  government  debt,  and  ( I I )  government  debt  and  rea I  assets 
are  Imperfect  substItutes,  the  Interest  rate- grONth  rate 
d I  f ferent I  a I  Is  a  posIt I  ve  funct I  on  of  the  stock  of  government 
debt:  a  higher  debt  Implies  a  higher  risk  premium;  moreover,  the 
r 1  se  I  n  consl.J11)t I  on,  brought  about  by  the  h I  gher  rea I  wea I th, 
decreases the rate of grONth  of the econany. 
Analogous  results are obtained by.Masson  (1985)  In  an  overlapplng-
generat Ions  rrocte 1  wIth  uncertaInty  about  government  def I  cIt 
f lnancl ng.  In  such  a  rrodel,  a  rIsing  debt,  by  affectIng  the 
subjective probability of  future monetization,  leads  to a  rise  In 
governemnt's  real  borrONing  costs which  feed  Into  the deficit  and 
bring forward  the prospects of debt unsustalnabl I lty. 
Both  models  point  to the conclusion that  the simple  reQUirement  of 
a  negative differential  at a  point  In  time  Is not  enough  to assess 
the sustalnablllty of a  set of government  pol lcles. 
If, e.g., we  assume  that the  Interest  rate-grONth rate differential 
Is a  I lnear  function of the  level  of publ lc debt  : 
r- y  •  ...a+ +eb,  the non-linear differential  eQuation  (2)  has  two 
a.  T1  •  stationary  eQUilibria  If  ~+4C.L~+(4  ...  -~  ...  )"'.]>0·  Therefore, 
the  stable  case  corresponds  to  ''small"  seigniorage-corrected 
prImary  def lc  1  ts  - ~  -[ct ... -\...._) m <ct/4-C,  wh 1  1  e  1  n  the  case  of 
"large" deficits,  the system  Is unstable. 
In  the case of  the  Implementation  of  a  credible  fiscal  adjustment 
plan,  the  fall  In  the  risk  premium  In  Interest  rates  has  to  be 
we I  ghted  agaInst  the  negat I  ve  Keynes I  an  danand  Impact  produced  by 
the  lONer  budget deficit. -24-
In  the med I un  run,  the  f I sea  I  conso  I I dat  I on  Is  I Ike  I y  to enta  I I  a 
permanent  reduct I on  of  the  d I f ferent  I a I •  In  the  short  run, 
haNever,  the  net  effect  depends  on  many  factors,  e.g.  the 
ava  I I ab  I I I ty of conSlJtl)t I on-snooth  I ng  I nstrunents,  the expectat Ions 
of  consuners  on  the  ''Inevitability" of  the  fiscal  adjustment,  the 
conf I dence ef  feet on  Investment decIsIons,  etc. 
The  short  run  effect  Is  Important  because  a  possible  unfavourable 
lltl)act  on  the  d I f ferent I a I  may  unclerm I ne  the  poI It  I ca  I 
sustalnabll lty of the fiscal  adjustment. 
In the rrocle I  deve  I oped  In Sect I on  I I ,  the ef  feet  I veness of rronetary 
author 1  tIes  1  n  contr 1  but  I ng  to the adjustment  depends  on  the  1  eve  1 
of the seIgn  I or  age tax base,  I . e.  the money  base-l  ncane rat  I  o  :  the 
I ewer  the va  I ue of the seIgn  I or  age tax base,  the hIgher  the r I se  In 
the  grc:wth  rate  of  money  base  to  extract  a  gIven  I eve  I  of 
seigniorage. 
GIven  the  current  I eve  I  of  the  money  base  - I noane  rat  I o  In  the 
maIn  I ndustr I a I  countr I es,  I f  the  centra  I  bank  retaIns  a  broad 
target  of  rronetary  stab  I I I ty,  any  pI  an  of  debt  stab  I I I zat  I on  Is 
bound  to  be  {a  IRDSt)  ent  I reI  y  carr  I ed  out  by  the  f I sea  I 
authorities. 
Even  In  the  case  of  Ita  I y,  where  the  money  base-GlP  rat  I o  Is 
considerably  higher  than  that  In  the  other  Industrial  countries, 
the  r I se  In  the  grc:wth  rate  of  the  money  base,  eIther  at  the 
begInnIng  or  at  the  end  of  the  per I od,  necessary  In  order  to 
Increase  the  level  of  seigniorage  non-negligibly  Is  likely  to 
conf I I ct wIth  the  requ I ranent  of rronetary  stab  I I I ty.  Furthenrore, 
It  Is  doubtful  that,  In  Italy's case,  even  the  present  level  of 
seigniorage could be maintained  In the near  future  ( 10): 
I)  the abolition of capital  controls  In a  context of  {almost) 
f I xed exchange rates  IIT1)1  I es a  I oss of autonany of rronetary -25-
poI Icy  the  need  for  a  further  convergence  of  the 
I nf  I at  I on  rate  tONard  the  average of  the  EC  cou I d  reQuIre 
stricter monetary dlsclpl lne; 
I I )  the  I I bera  I I zat  I  on  of  capIta  I  rrovanents  In  1990  and  the 
sIng  I e  market  In  1992  w I I I  st  IITl.l 1  ate  CCJTC)et 1  t  1  veness  and 
financial  Innovation  In  ltaly•s repressed  financial  system 
and  require  a  lower  reserve coefficient;  these effects are 
I Ike  I y  to cause a  drop  In the rroney  base-GP rat  I  o  toward a 
level  typical  of other  Industrial  economies. 
Therefore,  If the debt stabilization target  Is to be  achieved,  Italy's 
f I seal  author It  les  would  need  to  pursue  a  stronger  adjustment  In  the 
primary  balance  so  as  to  offset  the  lower  level  of  the  seigniorage 
revenue. 
In the above rrode  I ,  the on  1  y  contr  I bUt I on  that rronetary author It  1  es can 
give  to  f I seal  consolldat  I on  Is  through  rIsing  the  seigniorage  tax 
revenue.  HaNever,  It has  been  shown  ( 11)  that  In  a  model  of  an  open 
econany wIth  free capIta  I  rrob I I I ty, rronetary author It  I es can,  through a 
once-for-a  I I  deva  I uat  I on,  reduce  the  Interest rate on  goverrment  debt. 
Such  a  strategy wl II  result  In a  partial  Implicit repudiation of public 
debt. 
A  devaluation-Induced  Inflation can  be  effective  In  the  stabilization 
of publ lc debt provided that  : 
a)  no  further deva I uat  I  on  Is expected,  and 
b)  a  virtuous  f I seal  behaviour  Is credibly  Implemented. 
The  favourable effect devaluation on  the debt dynamics  Is twofold: 
I)  a  once-for-all  devaluation,  by  restoring  the  trust  In  the 
currency,  ental Is a  reduction  In nominal  Interest rates; -26-
II)  the  Induced  Inflation  allONs  a  further  tei11X>rary  reduction  In 
the  Interest  rate-growth  rate  differential.  Moreover,  If 
prices are  not  perfectly  flexible,  the  devaluation  gives  rise 
to a  temporary  real  depreciation which  may  offset  same  of  the 
demand  effects of the adjustment. 
HoNever,  If after the devaluation  the  "permanent"  differential  remains 
positive,  the primary balance must  eventually show  a  surplus. 
The  above  cons I  derat Ions  br I  ng  the  Issue  of  cred I  b I I I  ty  of  f I  sea  I 
author It I  es.  An  essent  I a I  pre-condItIon  to  mIn lm I se  poss I  b I e  output 
losses  and  to guarantee,  In  the case of  a  fiscal  package-c~change 
rate  devaluation,  a  permanent  reduction  In  the  differential,  Is  a 
fiscal  policy fully cannltted to public finance consolidation.  Without 
such  a  cannltment,  no  cooperation  {vs.  conflict)  scenario can  prevent 
the system to run  Into the "debt unsustalnablllty trap••. 
APPEf'.DIX 
The  Determination of the Egul I lbrlum Adjustment 
The  solutions of equation  {13)  and  {14)  are,  respectively 
(A1)  b(t.) :. 
(.  . 
f(o)  + [~.-(o) -..z - """ ]m  C( 
----------- +  2-+ 
t--~  (r- !1) 
.f(o) + ('i  ...  C•) + z'- C:"' ]"' 
\---!) -27-
{A2) 
The  stabilization of b{t) at the  I  r  - eve  attained at t  =  t  lmpl les  : 
(A3) 
b (.t) =  f(o) + IX f  + k  -t-[(j  owCa)-+ .:z..c. + .z.""- i..144  ]  1111 
t--:J 
By substituting b{t)  from  (Al)  and  solving for  0(  '  we  obtain  : 
(A4) 
where  :  ~::.  (t=-~)[feo) .,."11[4,..(a)-L~]-b(o}(r-~)}i'r-!nt 
A  - -e_(....,.,!)).:  >  o 
c = -28-




K  - 15-<X 
..A-c.... 
under Fiscal  Leadership 
under CDoperat I on 
under Mbnetary Leadership. 
If rronetary  authorities  foiiON  the  rule G(t)  •  ~(0) +Jt,  eQuations 
(A1)  and  (A2)  becane,  respect lvely  : 
b(t:) =  f(o) -t-[C..,.(o) -L""' ]""'  +  o( +  1> l+\  +  O'.t ~""'  -1:.  + 
(A5)  t- -~  (t--.!:))2.  t--~ 
+fb(o)- ~(C)+  ['i,..(o)-~)""1 - 0(-+ ~""" J  .£fr-!j )-1!. 
L  r-~  (r-~)z  - for  t::  ~  -f:.. 
<AS>  .b{t)::: £<:{;) + r.c.;.,.(o)- L'"'J""' + fb(i)- +Cih[t::t ... ci)-L  ....  ]~1~~t) 
t--!1  L  r-!'  :.J 
for  t~  t 
By  fo  I I  ON I ng  the  above  procedure,  we  obtaIn  the  1 1  near  eQU 1 1 1  br 1  un 
adjus'bnent 
(A7)  0( 
I f  monetary  author It  I es  are  w I I I I ng  to  raIse  ~  by  ~ each  year,  the 
eQUIIIbr lun f>  corresponding to 0(. =-CX  Is f:>::o -Ol. 
W\ -29-
s~ 
b  market  he  I d  pub I I  c  debt  <" of GJP) 
f  primary deficit (-) or surplus  (+)  <"of GOP) 
m  rroney  base  <" of C!JP) 
r-y  Interest rate-growth rate differential 





holdings of public debt 
rate of growth of money  base 
a)(./at 
ad  j us'bnent per I od 
annual  adjustment  In  f 
annual  adjustment  In  f  which  allows  the stabilization of  b 
at t, given ~(t) •  ~(0). 
r lse  In ~at  the beginning of the per lod 
rise  In~  at the end of the period 
K  r lse  In the pr lmary surplus at the end of the per lod 
(C  :  cooperation  ;  FL  :  fiscal  leadership;  M..  :  rronetary  leadership) 
Va I ues of the paremeters used  for the ca  I cuI at  I on of Tab I es 3-7 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table  3 
Linear adjustment  in the  primary  balance  to  be  carried  out  from  0  to t,  to 
stabilize b(t) at t, given  Gm,  = Gm(O)  :  ~ '  (f(t)) 
- t  3  7  10 
r  - y 
1,6  0,9  (0,45)  0,4  (0,50)  0,3  (0,54) 
2,0  1,2  (1,38  0,5  (1,53)  0,4  (1,64) 
3,0  1,5  (2,34)  0,7  (2,62)  0,5  (2,83) 
Table  4 
- Rise  in the  money  base  growth  to  stabilize b(t)  at  t  •  t,  when  the  annual 
adjustment  carried  out  by  fiscal  author!  ties  is  half  of  the  equilibrium 
one  :  (!X~o/.z)  Zc  zF 
'  ' 
- t  3  7  10 
r  - Y 
1,0  (0,44)  10,0  10,4  (0,19)  10,0  10,8  (0,14)  10,0  11,1 
2,0  (0,60)  13,4  14,2  (0,27)  13,4  15,4  (0,19)  13,4  16,3 
3,0  (0,76)  16,7  18,3  (0,34)  16,7  20,6  (0,25)  16,7  22,6 
Table  5 
"Jump"  in the  primary balance at t  •  t, needed  to stabilize b(t), when  0( is 
half of  the equilibirum adjustment and  Gm  •  Gm(O) 
( 0( -::.  (f  /2.  ) ,  K,  fK(t),  (f*(t)) 
- t  3  7  10 
r  - y 
1,0  (0,44)  1,3  0,5  (0,5)  (0,19)  1,4  0,6  (0,5)  (0,14)  1,4  0,6  (0,5) 
2,0  (0,60)  1,8  1,4 (1,4)  (0,27)  2,0  1,7  (1,5)  (0,19)  2,1  1,8  (1,6) 
3,0  (0,76)  2,4  2,4  (2,3)  (0,34)  2,7  2,9  (2,6)  (0,25)  2,9  3,2  (2,8) -33-
Table  6: 
Equilibrium  level  of  the  debt-GDP  ratio,  under  equilibrium  adjustment, 
{b*  \  0(  = 'lf )  cooperation  (bC [ a= -a/J.)  fiscal  or  monetary  leadership, 
( bFL  =  ])M~=f/2.) 
t  3  7  10 
r  - Y 
1,0  90,6  88,7  92,6  95,9  91,3  100,8  100,0  93,3  107,1 
2,0  92,0  89,3  94,7  99,2  92,9  106,0  104,7  95,7  114,9 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1)  See,  e.g.,  Suiter  (1985),  Clvldlni-Galll~sera (1987),  Gaiii-
Masera  ( 1988) ,  Maser  a  ( 1987) ,  Spaventa  ( 1987) . 
( 2)  Sane  of  the  1"1) I I catIons  for  debt  susta  I nab  I I I ty of. reI  axIng 
the  assumption  of  a  fixed  Interest  rate-growth  rate 
differential will  be explored  In the final  section. 
( 3)  Other  monetary  ru  I es,  e.g.  a  constant  share  of  the  over  a I I 
def I cIt  Is  money  f I nanced,  have  been  exp  I ored  In  the 
literature.  For  a  detailed  discussion,  see  Clvldlni-Gaiii-
Masera  ( 1987). 
(4)  The  tenn  1  +  t  (r - y)  - e<r  - y)t Is negative. 
Lets call t(r- y)  •  x  and  rearrange:  1  +  x  <eX.  By  taking 
the  I ogar I ttm of both sIdes we  have  :  In  ( 1  +  x)  <  x 
which  Is  always  true,  In  that  In  ( 1  +  x)  lies  below  the  45 
degree  I I ne for any va  I ue of x. 
( 5)  The  tenn  1  - e< r  - Y >  t  (  1  - t (  r  - y) )  1  s  pos  1  t 1  ve.  As  I n 
footnote  (4)  lets call  t(r  - y)  •  x,  rearrange  and  take  the 
Iogar lttm  : 
x  <  -In (1  - x) which  Is true for any value of x. 
(6)  See footnote (4). 
( 7)  Severa  I  authors  have  used  II f 1  xecl-paraneter  II  ana I ys Is  to 
Investigate  the  growth  of  public  debt  In  Italy.  See,  e.g., 
Clvldlni-Galll~sera  ( 1987),  Masera  ( 1987),  Rossi-Salvanlnl 
( 1987),  Spaventa  ( 1984,  1987).  For  a  COll)rehenslve  set  of 
papers  on  the consecauences  of  hIgh  pub  I I  c  debt  In  the  Ita  I I an 
exper I ence,  see G I avazz 1-Spaventa  ( 1988) . -36-
( 8)  See  Docunento  d 1  progrsnnaz I one  econan I co-f  I nanz I ar I a,  May 
1989. 
(9)  Here  we  lftl)tlcltly  assune  that  the  expected  lifetime of  the 
a:>verrment  Is  longer  than t  •  3.  S I nee  the average  I I fet  I  me  of 
a:>vernamt  In  Italy  Is  only  a  feN  months,  the  dl ff  lculty  In 
pursuing a  stronger adjustment could be easily explained. 
( 10)  For  a  recent  ana  I ys Is of  the  behavIour  of  the  seIgnIorage  tax 
In  Ita  I y  dur  I ng  the  per I od  1976-1987,  see  Brun 1-Penat  I -Porta 
( 1988) .  Ana I yses  of  the  seIgn  I or  age  tax  revenue  In  sever  a I 
countries  can  be  found  In Glavazzl  (1989),  Drazen  (1989),  and 
Gr II II  ( 1989). 
<  11 >  See But 1  <  1990),  ca1vo  <  1989). -37-
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